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Abstract This study constructs a panel threshold regression model to explore the price
impact of foreign institutional herding of firms listed in the Taiwan Stock Exchange during
January 2000 to June 2008. Our panel threshold model is constructed to explore the price impact
of foreign institutional investors’ herding in the Taiwan stock market after controlling the firm
size. By examining the presence of threshold effect, this study analyzes whether firm size would
obviously and asymmetrically affect the explanation for the effect of changes in foreign
investors’ share ownership on abnormal returns. The empirical results of this study find the
significant evidence of threshold effect which divides the stocks into large-size and small-size
firms. It is found that foreign institutional investors in the Taiwan stock market tend to hold
large-size stocks listed in the Taiwan Stock Exchange. There is an apparent increase in the
subsequent abnormal returns on large-size stocks bought in bulk by foreign investors. The
signals of changes in share ownership initiated by foreign institutional investors would reveal
further information for improving the performance of asset reallocation decisions in Taiwan.
The panel threshold model constructed in this paper well describes the price impact of
institutional herding yet eschews the possibly subjective data snooping issue resulting from the
two-pass sorting method as proposed by previous related researches.
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1 Introduction
Although foreign institutional investors hold just 20% of total equity and their trading
accounts for only 8% of total turnover in the Taiwan stock market, their share ownership
and trading amount are greater than those of local institutional investors, inferring possible
greater market influence. Besides, foreign institutional investors are in general equipped
with exceptional know-how in investment, and they are relatively more rational than other
investors. In addition, foreign institutional investors tend to focus more on long-term
investment performance than local institutional investors since 1998. As the government
gradually loosens the restrictions on share ownership by foreign investors, Taiwan stock
market would become more attractive.
Chen et al. (2007) demonstrate that MSCI Taiwan Index (MSCI-TWI) and the net
foreign investment dollar have a positive contemporaneous correlation. Li and Yung
(2004) find a significant positive relation between changes in institutional ownership and
ADR returns over the same period, and the positive relation persists after they control for
the momentum effect in the US stock markets. Chakravarty (2001), Dennis and Weston
(2000), and Sias et al. (2002) conclude that the relation between changes in institutional
ownership and returns measured over the same period results primarily from price effects
associated with institutional trading. Empirical results of Nofsinger and Sias (1999) and
Wermers (1999) found that stocks institutional investors buy do outperform those they sell.
Their results further demonstrate that the subsequent performance of small-size stocks with
large herding by institutional investors is stronger. Sias (2004) documents that institutional
herding is weakly positively correlated with future returns. Sias also finds institutional
cascades are more likely to occur in small-capitalization securities. Similar work proposed
by Chen et al. (2005) demonstrate that abnormal returns driven by buy herding of mutual
funds are larger than those driven by sell herding in the Taiwan stock market. The price
impact of institutional herding of firm size may obviously be differenced in an emerging
equity market like Taiwan’s because foreign institutional investors prefer to hold large-size
stocks in emerging markets. Therefore, the post-herding prices of these stocks on their
large herding are easily pushed up (such as shown in Lin and Swanson 2003).1
This phenomenon may result from the lower market value in market structure of plain-
plate type than that in the developed markets. In that case, abnormal returns of large-size
stocks come up with the herding of foreign investors. In comparison with the general
sorting procedure, adopted by prior studies to further analyze the price-impact of institu-
tional herding by firm size in the Taiwan stock market, it is beneficial to adopt a more
objective research method for exploring this issue in Taiwan.
It is also found from previous literatures that firm size is one of the major determinants
for institutional investors’ decision on their shareholdings.2 Hessel and Norman (1992),
Falkenstein (1996), Lin and Swanson (2003) and Chiao and Lin (2004) propose that
1 Hoitash and Krishnan (2008) deemed that specific measure of speculative intensity (SPEC) based on
autocorrelation in daily trading volume by market participants has a significant positive impact on returns.
2 The series studies of Fama and French (1992, 1993, 1995, 1996) clearly pointed out that the three factors
model of market, size and book-to-market ratio can catch the main variation of the cross-sectional expected
returns of stocks. Daniel and Titman (1997) demonstrated that firm size and book-to-market ratio are
correlated with the mean returns of assets, and the reason is not that they are the substitute of risk but that
characteristics can determine the mean stock returns.
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institutional investors tend to hold the large-size stocks with high growth, high visibility and
good performance. Chen et al. (2009) find that company size is among the predominant
factors in which foreign institutional investors take into account when making decisions in
each industry in the Taiwanese stock market. In addition, Lin and Swanson (2003) find that,
after controlling for firm size, foreigner’ short-term performance for large-size stocks is
better than performance for small-size stocks since the proportion of positive net share
purchases difference for large-size stocks is larger than the proportion for small-size stocks
on the Taiwan stock exchange (TSE).3 However, several representative literatures on
herding demonstrate that the subsequent abnormal returns of small-size stocks with large
increase in shareholding by institutional investors are larger than those of large-size stocks.
Wermers (1999) uses a two-pass sorting procedure to analyze the correlations between
institutional herding, firm size and post-herding returns. He finds that subsequent abnormal
returns on overbought portfolio are obviously larger than those of oversold portfolio, and the
impact of herding on abnormal returns for small-size stocks is larger than that for large-size
stocks. The results of Nofsinger and Sias (1999) find that, no matter adopting one-way or
two-pass sorting method, the subsequent performance of small-size stocks with large
increase in share ownership by institutional investors is stronger. In other words, they
support the price impact of institutional herding of small-size stocks in the US stock market.
The two-pass sorting procedure of Nofsinger and Sias (1999) and Wermers (1999) is a
sequential sorting method which can result in a problem of subjective determining for
threshold. Such a research design would give rise to estimation bias resulting from the
interactions between institutional investors’ herding and the block variable of firm size.
Therefore, we apply the panel threshold model proposed by Hansen (1999) to use obser-
vations of threshold variables to estimate the adaptive threshold in a panel data set, which
might eschew the possible data snooping problem of the N 9 N classification as employed
in the two-pass sorting method of Nofsinger and Sias (1999) and Wermers (1999). We
employ firm size as threshold variable to explore the impact of foreign institutional herding
on stocks’ abnormal returns while controlling variation caused by the market value. It is
examined that the relationship of changes in foreign institutional investors’ share owner-
ship and firm size in the same interval with post-herding abnormal returns by adopting
panel threshold method. Through this procedure, we can evaluate whether abnormal
returns driven by changes in foreign institutional investors’ share ownership are markedly
differentiated by firm size and analyze the information contents embedded therein.
The empirical results of this study find that there is one threshold which separates the
firms based on market capitalization. Large-size firms in the TSE-listed stocks are sig-
nificantly affected by the price impact of foreign institutional investors’ herding. If other
investors follow foreign institutional investors to purchase the stocks of large-size firms,
especially in Electronics and Plastics sectors, the average abnormal return would be better
if those stocks are held for 1 month or so. The major contribution of this study lies in the
design of a panel threshold model to objectively quantify the extent of firm size rather than
assuming in advance the degree of such constraints. Adopting this method could improve
the problem caused by subjective threshold determining and the interaction between the
two variables as seen in the two-pass sorting method of Nofsinger and Sias (1999) and
Wermers (1999). The explanation capability of foreign institutional herding on stocks’
abnormal returns in Taiwan is significantly increased by our econometric method.
3 Lin and Swanson (2003) used firm size as control variable to explore subsequent performance of the
winners and losers held by foreign investors while using proportion of positive net share purchases as
dependent variable.
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Remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Sect. 2 describes the research design
and methodology, including variable measurement, sample type and the establishment of
panel threshold model. The empirical results are discussed in Sect. 3, including data, basic
statistics and estimating results. The conclusions are summarized in Sect. 4.
2 Research design and methodology
2.1 The trading of foreign investors reflects information signals
Previous studies (such as Nofsinger and Sias 1999; Wermers 1999; Lin and Swanson 2003)
find that firm size is one of the information signals for the performance of institutional trading.
Nofsinger and Sias (1999) propose that the subsequent performance of small-size stocks with
a large increase in share ownership by institutional investors is stronger. Wermers (1999)
demonstrate that the impact of herding on abnormal returns for small-size stocks is larger than
that for large-size stocks. However, the results of Lin and Swanson (2003) show that the
foreign investors’ short-term performance of large-size stocks is better than the performance
of small-size stocks after controlling for the firm size in Taiwan. Therefore, it is worth our
clarifying whether the subsequent performance of foreign institutional herding on the large-
size stocks is larger than that on the small-size stocks in an emerging market like Taiwan since
foreign institutional investors prefer to trade in the stocks of large firms in the Taiwan stock
market with the market structure of the plain-plate type. In other words, we focus on the point
of view that the trading of foreign investors reflects information signals rather than trading
based on information asymmetry. The more complete integration of the price effects of the
herding by foreign institutional investors and firm size in Taiwan might well improve anal-
yses of the performance in terms of herding by institutional investors in the emerging market.
2.2 Types of sampling
To fulfill the requirement of duration of panel threshold model, this study uses the monthly
shareholding ratio of foreign institutional investors over the period from January 2000 to
June 2008. Based on well liquidity and general industrial property, we select the listed
companies who all traded over the period of 2000–2008 excluding preferred stocks,
warrants and full-cash delivery stocks in the Taiwan stock market. The majority of foreign
institutional investors prefer to trade the listed stocks as a way to closely and effectively
follow Taiwan’s stock index. Therefore, this study explores the monthly returns on indi-
vidual TSE-listed stocks all traded over the above mentioned period and the returns on
Taiwan weighted stock index (TAIEX) during the same period.
2.3 Variable measures
2.3.1 Measure of changes in institutional ownerships
Foreign institutional investors that are referred to in this study are qualified foreign
institutional investors (QFIIs) and general foreign institutional investors (GFIIs).
Share ownership of foreign investors is defined as their shareholdings divided by the
number of shares outstanding. Thus, an increase (decrease) in the fraction of shares held by
foreign investors represents a decrease (increase) in the percentage held by other investors.
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2.3.2 Abnormal returns
The abnormal return on individual stock i for a given month is initially calculated based on
a capital asset pricing model:4
Rai ¼ ri;t1rf ;t1
  bi rm;t1  rf ;t1
 
; t1 ¼ 11; . . .; 0 ð1Þ
2.3.3 Firm size
Firm size is measured by the market value of common shares, i.e., the unadjusted closing
price of stock i in the tth month times the number of shares outstanding.
MEi;t ¼ Qi;t  Pi;t ð2Þ
Qi, t (Pi,t) is the number of shares outstanding (the unadjusted closing price) of stock i in the
tth month, and MEi,t is monthly market value (defined as firm size) of stock i in the tth
month.
2.4 The price-impact of institutional herding of firm size
Nofsinger and Sias (1999) employ one-way sorting procedure to explore the impact of changes
in share ownership of institutional investors on stock returns. Further, Nofsinger and Sias
(1999) and Wermers (1999) adopt a two-pass sorting procedure to clarify whether subsequent
performance of stocks that institutional investors herd towards, or away from, evidently differs
by firm size in last year or last quarter. But in emerging markets with high turnover, like
Taiwan, changes in share ownership of institutional investors should be measured in more
frequent interval such like 1 month. Thus, this study uses the essence of two-pass sorting of
Nofsinger and Sias (1999) and Wermers (1999) to define control variable as firm size in last
month. The relation of these variables can be summarized as the following regression:
Rai;t ¼ ui þ a1DINi;t1 þ a2si;t1; i ¼ 1; 2; . . .; N; t ¼ 1; 2; . . .; T : ð3Þ
where R ai;t indicates abnormal returns of stock i in the tth month, DINi;t1 indicates changes
in share ownership of stock i held by foreign institutional investors in last month, and si,t-1
indicates firm size of stock i in last month. T is the number of experiencing month, and N is
the number of the TSE-listed stocks selected in this study.
The coefficient a1 of DINi;t1 represents the predictability of changes in share owner-
ship of foreign institutional investors in last month on abnormal returns in this month. To
eschew the possibly subjective division and the resulting data snooping issue adopted by
the two-pass sorting procedure of Nofsinger and Sias (1999) and Wermers (1999) and the
possible estimation bias resulting from the interactions between changes in institutional
investors’ share ownership and firm size, this study adopts the panel threshold method of
Hansen (1999) and uses the following threshold model to take firm size into account.5
4 ri;t1 is the monthly return for individual stock i in this month and past 11 months; rf ;t1 is the risk-free rate
in this month and past 11 months, which is the interest rate for a 1-month term deposit offered by Taiwan
First Bank; rm;t1 is the change ratio of net value of TAIEX in this month and past 11 months.
5 We mainly explore whether there is a difference between the post-herding premium of foreign institu-
tional investors’ trading on the large-size stocks and the post-herding premium of their trading on the small-
size stocks.
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Rai;t ¼ ui þ hsi;t1 þ bð1ÞDINi;t1Iðsi;t1 [ cÞ þ bð2ÞDINi;t1Iðsi;t1  cÞ þ ei;t ð4Þ
Ið:Þ is the indicator function, which is equal to 1 when si;t1 [ c, and 0 otherwise. c is
the value of threshold, which is unknown but can be estimated. The coefficient b ð1Þ denotes
the parameter vector in higher regime of firm size, and b ð2Þ denotes the parameter vector in
lower regime.
The meaning of Eq. (4) is accounted for as follows. Our sample is divided into two
regimes depending on whether the threshold variable of si;t1 is smaller or larger than the
threshold valuec. Thus, when s i;t1 [ c, firms are in a high regime of threshold variable;
otherwise, firms are in a low regime. Moreover, when foreign institutional investors
increase their share ownership in firms of smaller size, abnormal returns of smaller-size
firms are significantly positive, suggesting a positive b ð2Þ. Alternatively, when foreign
institutional investors decrease their share ownership in firms of larger size, those of larger-
size firms are still positive, suggesting an insignificant b ð1Þ. According to the results of
Nofsinger and Sias (1999) and Wermers (1999), we create the following null hypothesis to
explore whether there is an opposite result in the emerging stock market like Taiwan. The
null hypothesis constrained by the above statement is to test H0 : b
ð2Þ [ 0; bð1Þ  0.
The estimation and testing procedures in the panel threshold model used by this study
are based on Hansen’s (1999) suggestions. First, we rewrite Eq. (4) into an Eq. (5).
Rai;t ¼ ui þ hsi;t1 þ bDINi;t1ðcÞ þ ei;t ð5Þ
where bDINi;t1ðcÞ ¼
bð1ÞDINi;t1; if si;t1 [ c;
bð2ÞDINi;t1; if si;t1 [ c:
(
To delete individual-specific means, the regressing model of de-mean in this study is as
follows:
Rau ¼ bDINuðcÞ þ eu ð6Þ
where * denotes variables deviated from the group mean; that is, Ra;i;t ¼ Rai;t  Rai ;
DINi;t1 ¼ DINi;t1ðcÞ  DINi cð Þ; ei;t ¼ ei;t  ei; and Rai ; DINi and ei are the means of Ra,
DIN and e of firm i. Subsequently, we stack the time series data for an individual, with one
time period deleted, and let
Rai ¼
Rai2
..
.
RaiT
2
64
3
75; DINi ðcÞ ¼
DINi2ðcÞ
..
.
DINiTðcÞ
2
64
3
75; ei ¼
ei2
..
.
eiT
2
64
3
75 :
Then, let ra;DINðcÞand e*denote the data stacked over all individuals, for example:
DINðcÞ ¼
DIN1ðcÞ
..
.
DINi ðcÞ
..
.
DINnðcÞ
2
6666664
3
7777775
.
From the above definition, we can further rewrite Equation (6) as Equation (7):
194 Y.-C. Lu et al.
123
Ra ¼ DINðcÞbþ e ð7Þ
For any given c, the slope coefficient b can be estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS).
That is,
bbðcÞ ¼ DINðcÞ0DINðcÞ
 1
DINðcÞ0Ra ð8Þ
The sum of squared errors is the following Eq. 6
S1ðcÞ ¼ beðcÞ
0
beðcÞ ¼ Ra0 I  DINðcÞ0 DINðcÞ0DINðcÞ
 1
DINðcÞ0 ÞRa
 
ð9Þ
Hansen (1999) recommended estimation of c by lease squares. This is most easily achieved
by minimizing the concentrated sum of squared errors in Eq. 10. Hence, the least squares
estimator of c is
c
^ ¼ arg min
Ra
S1ðcÞ ð10Þ
Once c^ is obtained, the slope coefficient estimate is bb ¼ bbðcÞ.
It is important to determine whether the threshold effect is statistically significant. This
can be examined by testing whether coefficients in two regimes are the same. The null
hypothesis of no threshold effect is as follows:
H0 : b
ð1Þ ¼ bð2Þ ð11Þ
In other words, the coefficients b ð1Þ and b ð2Þ in two regimes have different explanations,
implying that there is an asymmetric threshold effect at least on the value of threshold
variable si;t1 for changes in share ownership by foreign institutional investors explaining
abnormal returns. The likelihood ratio ofH0suggested by Hansen (1999) is based on the
following test statistics:6
F1 ¼ S0  S1 c^ð Þ=r^2 ð12Þ
Hansen (1996) suggests a bootstrap to simulate the asymptotic distribution of the
likelihood ratio test, and he proposed that a bootstrap procedure attains the first-order
asymptotic distribution.
However, it is possible that the specification contains more than one threshold.
Examination of whether the system has more than one threshold can be preceded as
follows. First, we employ F1 test to assess the null hypothesis of no threshold. If this null
hypothesis is rejected, at least one threshold is ensured. Then, we proceed to test the null of
one threshold against the two thresholds. The notation F2 is used to denote this test.
7
F2 ¼ S1 c^1ð Þ  Ss2 c^s2
 
=r^2 ð13Þ
The significant F2 implies the rejection of the null of one threshold and two thresholds
are expected. We repeat this procedure to test the null hypothesis of two and more
6 Where S0 and S1 are the residual sum of squares under the null and alternative of (12) respectively, and
r^2 ¼ e^0 e^=nðT  1Þ is residual variance under H1, where the residual vector is e^ ¼ e^ c^ð Þ. Under the null
hypothesis the threshold is not identified, the classical tests have non-standard distributions, which is called
the ‘Davies’ Problem proposed by Davies (1977).
7 Where r^2 ¼ Ss2 c^s2
 
=nðT  1Þ and c2 is the second threshold.
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thresholds and denote them as F2, F3,… etc. The critical values are also based on boot-
strapping method.
Once the existence of the threshold effect is determined, the next question is whether the
threshold value, c, can be known. When there is a threshold effect (bð1Þ 6¼ bð2Þ), Chan
(1993) and Hansen (1999) show that c^ is consistent for c0 (the true value of c). They also
show that the asymptotic distribution is highly non-standard. Hansen (1999) argues that the
best way to form confidence intervals for c is to form the no-rejection region C að Þ, where
C að Þ ¼ 2 log 1  ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ1  ap .8 To test the hypothesis H0 : c ¼ c0, the no-rejection region
of confidence level (1-a) is the set of values of c such that LR1ðcÞCðaÞ, where9
LR1ðcÞ ¼ S1ðc0Þ  S1 c^ð Þ=r^2 ð14Þ
If two thresholds cannot be rejected, the confidence intervals for two threshold parameters
(c1, c2) can be constructed in the following statement.
10
LRs2ðcÞ ¼ Ss2ðc0Þ  Ss2 c^s2
 
=r^2 ð15Þ
3 Empirical results
3.1 The basic statistics of data and the use of panel unit root
In this study we use an unbalanced panel of TSE-listed stocks, and our methods are
designed for balanced panels. We take a subset of 247 firms observed during
2000.01–2008.06. Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of the four main variables.
The means of R ai;t, DINi;t1, and ME i;t1 are 0.767, 0.052, and 27,902.520, respectively.
11
The standard deviations, maximum, minimum values of these variables are also reported.
Firm size has the largest standard deviation of 106,605, and is in sharp contrast to 4.038
and 1.355 for the remaining two variables, respectively. In addition, the nontrivial standard
deviation of abnormal returns results from huge variation of abnormal returns across firms.
Finally, the skewness far from 0 and kurtosis far from 3 show the non-normal distributions
for these variables.
Hansen’s (1999) panel threshold regression is an extension of the traditional least
squared estimation method, and the variables in the model must be stationary to avoid
spurious regression. Since the data are all panel in our investigation, the well known LLC
(Levin et al. 2002), IPS (Im et al. 1997) and Hadri (2000) techniques are employed to
proceed the panel unit root test.12 The results of the stationary test for each panel (DINi;t1,
ln MEi;t1, and Rai;t) show that regardless of the method used, all the variables are most
8 He uses the likelihood ratio statistic for tests on c:
9 S1ðc0Þ and S1 c^ð Þ are the residual sum of squares from Eq. 10 given the true threshold c0 and estimated c^,
respectively.
10 S s2 c^
s
2
 
is defined in (14). The asymptotic ð1  aÞ% confidence intervals for c2 and c1 are the set of
values of c, such that LRs2ðcÞCðaÞ and LR1ðcÞCðaÞ respectively.
11 The means of one-month abnormal returns R ai;t from 2000.01 to 2005.12, 2006.12, 2007.12 and 2008.06
are 0.630, 0.600, 0.728 and 0.767, respectively. That is, the 1-month abnormal returns present the stable
increase in price.
12 The LLC (2001) and IPS (1997) techniques assumed that the null hypothesis are set as unit root, and the
Hadri (2001) assumed that the null hypothesis is set as stationary.
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likely to carry stationary characteristics. The stationary natures of those variables make
estimations of the panel threshold regression move forward.
3.2 Results of test and estimation
This study adopts statistics F to examine the equality of coefficients in two regimes of firm
size. That is, to examine the presence of threshold effect. In addition, we adopt LR test to
examine the potential threshold value. Table 2 presents that statistics F2 and F3 are smaller
than the critical values at the 10% significance level, while F1 exceeds the critical value at
the same significance level. Thus, the null hypothesis of no threshold is clearly rejected and
one threshold is suggested. Table 1 depicts that the standard deviation of firm size is nearly
106,605, and the maximum and minimum values are nearly 1,873,427 and 213. Therefore,
using at least one threshold may avoid neglecting the dispersed firm sizes.
The bottom of Table 2 reports the estimated one threshold, which is e8.0226 (amounting
to the market value of 3,049.0947 NT$ million) and attain statistically significant level. In
other words, the influence of changes in foreign investors’ share ownership on abnormal
returns may be further divided into two regimes by using firm size as threshold variables.
The two regimes are referred to as small size and large size if their market value falls
in-between 0 and 3,049.0947 (NT$ million) and exceed 3,049.0947 (NT$ million),
respectively. Subsequently, we can estimate the corresponding confidence intervals by
computing the LR test. Figure 1 shows that the 95% confidence intervals are from
531.1260 to 4,783.8460 (NT$ million) for the significant threshold, which the likelihood
ratio lies beneath the dotted line. Table 3 reports the number of firms in each category and
in each year.13 Figure 2 reveals that on average, roughly 71–72 firms fall in the small-size
regime each month, while approximately 175–176 firms fall in the large-size regime in
each month. The use of two regimes could take the heteroskedasticity due to firm size into
account.
Other than the conventional OLS standard errors, this study also uses the White-
corrected standard errors in favor of heteroskedasticity which violates one of the
assumptions of our asymptotic analysis.14 The regression slope estimates, OLS and White-
corrected standard errors are displayed in Table 4. We find that ln MEi;t1 and its powers
are statistically significant, indicating an obviously positive relationship between firm size
Table 1 Summary statistics of variables
Variables Mean Std dev. Max Min Skew. Kurt.
Rai;t 0.766879 4.038008 33.22512 -15.197 1.22901 4.29466
DINi;t1 0.051868 1.355089 30.44 -42.61 -4.05897 181.149
MEi;t1 (NT$ million) 27902.52 106605 1873427 213 10.4993 132.520
TOi;t1 16.80002 21.63623 264.4124 0.001 2.94523 12.2762
13 First, we find the number of firms in each regime by each month. Then, we take an average on the number
of firms in a specific regime for each month by each year.
14 Based on the theory of Hansen (1999) for least squares threshold regression, we would expect the
threshold estimates to be consistent and the distribution theory of Theorem 1 to be correct up to a scale
effect.
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and abnormal returns. The coefficients of changes in foreign institutional investors’ share
ownership of primary interest suggest that the firms with the large size unexpectedly have
the larger and significantly positive coefficient of 0.138, and the firms with the small size
have the smaller and insignificantly negative coefficient of -0.024. The signs of the two
coefficients reject the price impact of institutional herding of small-size stocks, and
oppositely suggesting that abnormal returns of large-size firms obviously increase when
foreign investors increase their share ownership in them (market value larger than
3049.0947 NT$ million). In addition, the coefficient in the large-size regime attains 1%
significant level. Unexpectedly, when foreign investors increase their share ownership in
small-size firms, abnormal returns of those firms decrease insignificantly. On the one hand,
as Hessel and Norman (1992), Falkenstein (1996) and Lin and Swanson (2003) demon-
strate that institutional investors prefer to hold the large-size stocks with good perfor-
mance. Therefore, large herding of foreign investors on large-size stocks pushes the prices
of these stocks up. This means that there is greater influence on the price movements of
large-size stocks, which is consistent with the result of Lin and Swanson (2003). On the
other hand, market values of most TSE-listed firms in Taiwan are obviously lower than
those of firms in the developed countries. Thus, the large-size stocks with good perfor-
mance in the TSE-listed firms are much favored by foreign institutional investors. Sub-
sequent abnormal returns of these large stocks tend to increase significantly.
It is notable that the 247 balanced panels in the TSE-listed stocks can be divided into
fifteen sectors based on the industry category of TSEC.15 The result of Table 5 presents
that the average size of Electronics sector is larger, but its standard deviation is the largest
among all sectors. Further, we find that firms in the large-size regime are apparently
concentrated in five sectors, with the highest number of observations in Electronics sector,
followed in sequence by Plastics, Others, Chemistry and Textiles sectors. Such results
imply that among the TSE-listed firms that foreign investors prefer to hold, subsequent
Table 2 Tests for threshold effects and threshold estimates of firm size
Null hypothesis Statistic F Bootstrap p value
H0: no threshold F1 = 15.381** 0.040
H1: single threshold
(Critical values of 10, 5, 1%) (12.367, 14.633, 20.672)
H0: single threshold F2 = 7.835 0.380
H1: double threshold
(Critical values of 10, 5, 1%) (13.146, 15.967, 33.493)
H0: double threshold F3 = 7.094 0.180
H1: triple threshold
(Critical values of 10, 5, 1%) (7.915, 9.958, 10.931)
Estimate 95% Confidence interval
Threshold estimates
cs1
^
= e8.0226 = 3049.0947 (NT$million)
[e6.275, e8.473]
The numbers in () indicate the p values of bootstrap, and the numbers in [] indicate the confidence interval of
threshold estimates in 95% significant level
** denotes significance at the 5% level
15 TSEC is the Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation.
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Fig. 1 Confidence interval of ln (market value) construction in single threshold model
Table 3 Number of firms in each regime by year
Number of firm class Year
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
DINi;t1ðMEi;t1  3049:09Þ 173 137 157 165 183 177 180 206 205
DINi;t1ðMEi;t1 [ 3049:09Þ 74 110 90 82 64 70 67 41 42
Total number 247 247 247 247 247 247 247 247 247
Fig. 2 Number of firms in small-size and large-size regimes each month
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abnormal returns on large-size firms, especially those in the Electronics and Plastics sectors
are stronger. In other words, if other investors follow foreign investors to purchase the
stocks of large-size firms in TAIEX belonging to those two sectors and hold them for
1 month, the performance persistence of subsequent abnormal returns is significantly
better.
3.3 Robustness tests
To explore whether the time period affects the conclusion regarding the effect of size, the
paper further resupplies a sub-sample analysis from January 2000 to December 2005,
December 2006, December 2007 and June 2008, respectively, so as to add valuable
insights into the stability of the price-impact of institutional herding on firm size in an
emerging market like that of Taiwan. Tables 6, 7, 8 and 9 in appendix report the tests for
the threshold effects and threshold estimates of firm size. The results consistently find the
presence of one threshold based on the test of the threshold effect regardless of changes in
the data periods from 2000.01 to 2005.12, 2006.12, 2007.12 or 2008.06. Then, Tables 10,
11, 12 and 13 in appendix report the regression estimates of the single threshold of firm
size. The estimated results of the threshold regression consistently demonstrate that the
large firms have larger and significantly positive coefficients, and the small firms have
smaller and negative coefficients. The signs of the two-regime coefficients suggest that the
abnormal returns of large firms obviously increase when foreign investors increase their
share ownership in them. In addition, the coefficient in the large-size regime consistently
attains a 1% significance level. Conversely, the abnormal returns of those firms decrease
when foreign investors increase their share ownership in small-size firms.
Moreover, to explore whether post-herding abnormal returns are due to a permanent or
simply transitory price appreciation, this paper regards turnover and the book-to-market
ratio as control variables, respectively, when analyzing the price-impact of institutional
herding on firm size. The added threshold models are illustrated as follows:
Rai;t ¼ ui þ h1q1i;t1 þ bð1ÞDINi;t1Iðsi;t1 [ cÞ þ bð2ÞDINi;t1Iðsi;t1  cÞ þ ei;t ð16Þ
where q1i;t1 is turnoveri,t-1.
Rai;t ¼ ui þ h2q2i;t1 þ bð1ÞDINi;t1Iðsi;t1 [ cÞ þ bð2ÞDINi;t1Iðsi;t1  cÞ þ ei;t ð17Þ
where q2i;t1 is book/marketi,t-1.
Tables 14 and 15 in appendix report the regression estimates of the single threshold of
firm size including the control variables of turnover and the book-to-market ratio,
respectively. The results find the consistent one-month abnormal returns of the large firm
effect regardless of turnover, the book-to-market ratio or firm size as a control variable.
Table 4 Regression estimates: single threshold model of firm size
Regressor Coefficient estimate OLS SE White SE
ln MEi;t1 1.84203*** 0.05244 0.05684
DINi;t1ðMEi;t1  3049:0947Þ -0.02432 0.03566 0.04485
DINi;t1ðMEi;t1 [ 3049:0947Þ 0.13791*** 0.02140 0.02421
*** denotes significance at the 1% level
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Table 5 The basic statistics of market values in small-and large-sized regimes of different industries
SIC Industry Regime Obs MEi, t-1 (unit: NT$ million)
Mean SD Max Min
11 Cement Large-sized
regime
619 191344 3070 22921.08 32924.91
Small-sized
regime
95 3043 979 2313.64 538.12
12 Food Large-sized
regime
594 182746 3051 16839.59 28506.22
Small-sized
regime
834 3048 296 1626.59 725.77
13 Plastics Large-sized
regime
1262 737201 3059 72118.59 127016.00
Small-sized
regime
268 3046 968 2183.44 507.57
14 Textiles Large-sized
regime
1066 232081 3054 17865.52 30689.01
Small-sized
regime
1892 3042 334 1450.66 659.47
15 Electric & Machinery Large-sized
regime
657 71765 3051 10658.45 9347.00
Small-sized
regime
771 3041 225 1772.86 690.92
16 Electric appliance and
Cable
Large-sized
regime
606 92682 3051 12051.90 15742.94
Small-sized
regime
210 3046 770 2165.90 572.89
17 Chemistry Large-sized
regime
1086 144550 3055 12046.80 13614.56
Small-sized
regime
750 3048 213 1826.88 754.90
18 Glass Large-sized
regime
104 79806 3132 37306.45 12462.95
Small-sized
regime
100 2836 885 1544.89 528.30
19 Papermaking Large-sized
regime
476 25403 3171 10382.59 5146.27
Small-sized
regime
34 3018 1555 2497.26 415.13
20 Steel & Iron Large-sized
regime
985 597817 3060 37856.19 92213.95
Small-sized
regime
545 3037 396 1942.30 722.99
21 Rubber Large-sized
regime
611 96423 3057 12779.90 13575.08
Small-sized
regime
103 3047 1199 2444.64 411.36
22 Automobile Large-sized
regime
408 90219 3744 33662.93 21106.16
Small-sized
regime
319 3046 876 2118.59 568.21
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The results of these robustness tests show that the one-month abnormal returns of
herding by foreign institutional investors on large firms in an emerging market like Taiwan
are not affected by the different periods of data expansion or the different control variables.
Thus, these one-month abnormal returns are a permanent rather than a simply transitory
price appreciation.
Table 5 continued
SIC Industry Regime Obs MEi, t-1 (unit: NT$ million)
Mean SD Max Min
23 Electronics Large-sized
regime
4373 1873427 3057 86135.74 228784.54
Small-sized
regime
212 3047 505 1888.38 676.56
24 Electronic component Large-sized
regime
102 26221 8499 16005.63 3667.99
Small-sized
regime
Non Non Non Non Non
25 Construction Large-sized
regime
808 44725 3058 10806.05 7224.87
Small-sized
regime
426 3031 314 1416.69 668.04
26 Transportation Large-sized
regime
900 95719 3055 28491.74 22010.98
Small-sized
regime
239 3032 379 1968.42 863.78
27 Tourism Large-sized
regime
271 20746 3063 6958.82 3664.89
Small-sized
regime
30 3032 2252 2820.37 182.31
28 Finance Large-sized
regime
888 118794 3063 20112.11 23208.78
Small-sized
regime
197 3049 640 1530.48 587.22
29 Department stores Large-sized
regime
721 105243 3076 16110.71 19075.18
Small-sized
regime
102 2849 489 1392.57 539.00
99 Others Large-sized
regime
1218 93161 3068 13658.88 14812.92
Small-sized
regime
312 3048 1144 2188.77 524.18
Total Large-sized
regime
17755 246003.65 3374.70 24738.48 36239.76
Small-sized
regime
7439 2869.30 720.95 1854.67 556.84
Non represents no firm is ascribed in this regime as panel threshold is used
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4 Conclusion
This study constructs a panel threshold regression model to explore the price impact of
foreign institutional herding of firms listed in the Taiwan Stock Exchange during January
2000 to June 2008. By examining the presence of threshold effect, this study analyzes
whether firm size would obviously and asymmetrically affect the explanation for the
effect of changes in foreign investors’ share ownership on abnormal returns. We find the
significant evidence of one threshold which separates the firms based on firm size in
Taiwan.
The panel threshold model proposed by this paper could objectively quantify the extent
of firm size rather than assuming the degree of such constraints in advance. It could avoid
the data snooping issue inherent in the two-pass sorting method (Nofsinger and Sias 1999;
Wermers 1999), and strengthen the reliability of explanation of abnormal returns by
institutional herding.
The empirical results of this study find that, among firms in large-size regime, the price
impact of changes in share ownership of foreign investors is positively significant.
Empirical results also find that foreign investors tend to hold the large-size firms in TSE.
Therefore, the subsequent prices of these stocks on their large herding would be pushed up.
While foreign investors increase their share ownership in firms with the market equity
larger than the estimated threshold, abnormal returns on those stocks obviously increase.
The result is opposite to the price impact of institutional herding of small-size stocks as
proposed in prior empirical studies like Nofsinger and Sias (1999) and Wermers (1999)
which states that subsequent performance of small-size stocks largely held by institutional
investors is stronger. However, the phenomenon agrees with the fact that the subsequent
performance of large-size stocks is bought in bulk by institutional investors as counters of
index manipulation in market structure of plain-plate type, like Taiwan, which is consistent
with the argument of Lin and Swanson (2003).
This study further finds that, among the TSE-listed firms that are held by foreign
investors, the price impact of institutional herding of large-size firms, especially in
Electronics and Plastics sectors, are particularly stronger. The signals of changes in share
ownership initiated by foreign investors would reveal further information for improving
the performance of asset reallocation decisions in Taiwan. Results of this study con-
tribute to studies on price effects of institutional herding such as Sias et al. (2002), and
will be integrated with a series of studies on herding by controlling the effect caused by
firm characteristics. The panel threshold model constructed in this paper well describes
the price impact of institutional herding yet eschews the possibly subjective data
snooping issue resulting from the two-pass sorting method as proposed by previous
related research.
Appendix
See Tables 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15.
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Table 6 Appendix from
2000.01 to 2005.12: tests for
threshold effects and threshold
estimates of firm size
The numbers in () indicate the
p values of bootstrap, and the
numbers in [] indicate the
confidence interval of threshold
estimates in 95% significant level
* denotes significance at the 10%
level
Null hypothesis Statistic F Bootstrap p value
H0: no threshold F1 = 6.5579* 0.090
H1: single threshold
(Critical values of 10, 5,
1%)
(11.895, 15.888,
17.886)
H0: single threshold F2 = 8.1011 0.710
H1: double threshold
(Critical values of 10, 5,
1%)
(12.322, 16.396,
26.658)
H0: double threshold F3 = 8.3204 0.820
H1: triple threshold
(Critical values of 10, 5,
1%)
(13.582, 17.665,
28.852)
Estimate 95% Confidence interval
Threshold estimates
cs1
^
= e6:5579 = 704.7901 (NT$million)
[e6:1883, e12:7229]
Table 7 Appendix from
2000.01 to 2006.12: tests for
threshold effects and threshold
estimates of firm size
The numbers in () indicate the
p values of bootstrap, and the
numbers in [] indicate the
confidence interval of threshold
estimates in 95% significant level
* denotes significance at the 10%
level
Null hypothesis Statistic F Bootstrap p value
H0: no threshold F1 = 6.5439* 0.060
H1: single threshold
(Critical values of 10, 5,
1%)
(10.572, 13.631,
32.997)
H0: single threshold F2 = 8.1080 0.460
H1: double threshold
(Critical values of 10, 5,
1%)
(11.237, 14.315,
21.698)
H0: double threshold F3 = 8.3217 0.280
H1: triple threshold
(Critical values of 10, 5,
1%)
(7.501, 10.887, 19.940)
Estimate 95% Confidence interval
Threshold estimates
cs1
^
= e6.5439 = 694.9918 (NT$million)
[e6.2166, e8.5753]
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Table 8 Appendix from
2000.01 to 2007.12: tests for
threshold effects and threshold
estimates of firm size
The numbers in () indicate the
p values of bootstrap, and the
numbers in [] indicate the
confidence interval of threshold
estimates in 95% significant level
** denotes significance at the 5%
level
Null hypothesis Statistic F Bootstrap p value
H0: no threshold F1 = 6.5425** 0.030
H1: single threshold
(Critical values of 10, 5,
1%)
(11.173, 12.608,
15.352)
H0: single threshold F2 = 8.0196 0.360
H1: double threshold
(Critical values of 10, 5,
1%)
(12.132, 13.869,
22.675)
H0: double threshold F3 = 8.7142 0.150
H1: triple threshold
(Critical values of 10, 5,
1%)
7.866, 10.044, 11.856)
Estimate 95% Confidence interval
Threshold estimates
cs1
^
= e6.5425 = 694.0195 (NT$million)
[e6.2538, e8.4865]
Table 9 Original from 2000.01
to 2008.06: tests for threshold
effects and threshold estimates of
firm size
The numbers in () indicate the
p values of bootstrap, and the
numbers in [] indicate the
confidence interval of threshold
estimates in 95% significant level
** denotes significance at the 5%
level
Null hypothesis Statistic F Bootstrap p value
H0: no threshold F1 = 15.381** 0.040
H1: single threshold
(Critical values of 10, 5,
1%)
(12.367, 14.633,
20.672)
H0: single threshold F2 = 7.835 0.380
H1: double threshold
(Critical values of 10, 5,
1%)
(13.146, 15.967,
33.493)
H0: double threshold F3 = 7.094 0.180
H1: triple threshold
(Critical values of 10, 5,
1%)
(7.915, 9.958, 10.931)
Estimate 95% Confidence interval
Threshold estimates
cs1
^
= e8.0226 = 3049.0947 (NT$million)
[e6.275, e8.473]
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Table 10 Appendix from 2000.01 to 2005.12: regression estimates of single threshold of firm size
Regressor Coefficient estimate OLS SE White SE
ln MEi;t1 1.23795*** 0.07038 0.09054
DINi;t1ðMEi;t1  704:7901Þ -0.28690** 0.14243 0.059278168
DINi;t1ðMEi;t1 [ 704:7901Þ 0.08205*** 0.02344 0.025773603
***, ** denote significance at the 1 and 5% level, respectively
Table 11 Appendix from 2000.01 to 2006.12: regression estimates of single threshold of firm size
Regressor Coefficient estimate OLS SE White SE
ln MEi;t1 1.23342*** 0.06264 0.08174
DINi;t1ðMEi;t1  694:9918Þ -0.30749*** 0.10739 0.03782
DINi;t1ðMEi;t1 [ 694:9918Þ 0.08695*** 0.02137 0.02363
*** denotes significance at the 1% level
Table 12 Appendix from 2000.01 to 2007.12: regression estimates of single threshold of firm size
Regressor Coefficient estimate OLS SE White SE
ln MEi;t1 1.44533*** 0.05309 0.07186
DINi;t1ðMEi;t1  694:0195Þ -0.29298*** 0.10415 0.03830
DINi;t1ðMEi;t1 [ 694:0195Þ 0.09891*** 0.01958 0.02158
*** denotes significance at the 1% level
Table 13 Appendix from 2000.01 to 2008.06: regression estimates of single threshold of firm size
Regressor Coefficient estimate OLS SE White SE
ln MEi;t1 1.84203*** 0.05244 0.05684
DINi;t1ðMEi;t1  3049:0947Þ -0.02432 0.03566 0.04485
DINi;t1ðMEi;t1 [ 3049:0947Þ 0.13791*** 0.02140 0.02421
*** denotes significance at the 1% level
Table 14 Appendix for control variable of TO: regression estimates of single threshold of firm size
including the control variable of turnover
Regressor Coefficient estimate OLS SE White SE
TOi;t1 0.07366*** 0.00126 0.00195
DINi;t1ðMEi;t1  3049:0947Þ -0.02915 0.03436 0.04442
DINi;t1ðMEi;t1 [ 3049:0947Þ 0.13354*** 0.02057 0.02351
*** denotes significance at the 1% level
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